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THE DANGERS OF MISAPPROPRIATION: MISUSING
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.'S LEGACY TO
PROVE THE COLORBLIND THESIS
Ronald Turner*
This Article seeks to illustrate that those who attempt to use Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. 's legacy to promote the colorblind thesis can only do so
by disingenuously distorting and deviating from Dr. King's actual
views on race. As argued herein, Dr. King was more "color-aware"
than "colorblind, "citing several examples of King's race consciousness.
King expressed his support for affirmative action, indicating that such
programs were an appropriate response to past discrimination and
exploitation of people of color; he did not reject the avowedly race-
conscious Black power movement; and King advocated patronizing
Black banks and insurance companies. Turner concludes that
conservative attempts to co-opt Dr. King's legacy to promote their own
"colorblind" agenda can only be achieved by oversimplifying and
acontextualizing King's views, as well as by omitting or ignoring
King's numerous race-conscious assertions.
I have a dream my four little children will one day live in a
nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but
by the content of their character. I have a dream today!'
In 1963, on a sweltering August afternoon, we stood in
Washington, D.C., and talked to the nation about many things.
Toward the end of that afternoon, I tried to talk to the nation
about a dream that I had had, and I must confess to you today
that not long after talking about that dream I started seeing it
turn into a nightmare.2
Simplify, simplify-that is the imperative of the hero industry.3
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. B.A. 1980,
Wilberforce University; J.D. 1984, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I thank
Angela J. Davis (American University, Washington College of Law), Wythe Holt
(University of Alabama School of Law), and Jerome A. Hoffman (University of Ala-
bama School of Law) for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
219 (James M. Washington ed., 1986) [hereinafter TESTAMENT OF HOPE].
2. Id. at 257.
3. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Heroes, Inc.: Dr. King Deified and Digitized, THE NEW
YORKER, Jan. 16, 1995, at 6, 7.
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INTRODUCTION
Once again, recent incidents have revealed that the colorblind
thesis, the notion that "race, 4 does not or should not matter and that
society and its laws are or can be colorblind, is simply unfounded.5
Race discrimination in the context of the workplace received
significant media attention when an executive of Texaco, Inc. tape-
recorded meetings where company executives belittled minority
employees and discussed the unlawful destruction of documents
sought by plaintiffs in a pending employment discrimination suit.
6
The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that minority employees worked in
a racially hostile environment and that Texaco had systematically
discriminated against minorities in promotions.7 The meetings were
secretly tape-recorded in 1994 by Texaco's then-senior coordinator
for personnel services, Richard Lundwall, and were turned over to
the plaintiffs' attorney by Lundwall after he was dismissed from
Texaco during a reduction-in-force.8 News accounts of the contents
of the tapes reported Texaco executives referring to African Ameri-
can employees as "black jelly beans" and "niggers" and complaining
about the celebration of Kwanzaa9 by Blacks.' ° While Texaco's top
4. The word "race" is commonly used in discussions concerning African Ameri-
cans and other people of color. While I use that word in this Article for the sake of
convenience, I note my agreement with the view that there is only one biological
race-the human race. See Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and
the Illusion of Race, in RACE, WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 21, 35-6 (Henry Louis Gates,
Jr. ed., 1985); Darlene C. Hine, "In the Kingdom of Culture": Black Women and the Inter-
section of Race, Gender, and Class, in LURE AND LOATHING: ESSAYS ON RACE, IDENTITY,
AND THE AMBIVALENCE OF ASSIMILATION 337, 338 (Gerald Early ed., 1993). The term
"race" is an incoherent fiction, has no inherent meaning, and is defined by the social
contexts through and within which it is constructed. See DAVID THEO GOLDBERG,
RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICS OF MEANING 80-84 (1993); HOWARD
WINANT, RACIAL CONDITIONS: POLITICS, THEORIES, COMPARISONS 14-17 (1994); D.
Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 GEO. L.J.
437, 439 (1993); Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum and the Pursuit of Indi-
vidualism in the Making of Social Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1362 n.38 (1995).
5. The colorblind premise is not only discussed in legal and nonfictional settings.
In the novel Primary Colors, the African American narrator states that there are two
subgroups of White people: (1) the truly colorblind who "will argue with you, yell at
you, treat you like a human;" and (2) the "occasional miracles" who are race-
conscious and "who just lay it all out there." ANONYMOUS, PRIMARY COLORS: A
NOVEL OF POLmrcs 27 (1996).
6. See Kurt Eichenwald, Texaco Executives, On Tape, Discussed Impeding a Bias Suit,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at Al.
7. See id.
8. See Clarence Page, The Texaco Tapes: White Men Behaving Badly, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
6, 1996, at 21.
9. Kwanzaa is an annual seven day cultural celebration that gives Blacks an op-
portunity to renew and reaffirm those values and strengths that lie at the root of
Black history. Ed.
[VOL. 2:101
FALL 1996] Misusing Martin Luther King, Jr. 's Legacy
official has condemned the tapes and the statements made by com-
pany executives," one African American commentator notes that
"the Texaco tapes are to the issue of job discrimination what the
Rodney King tapes were to police brutality.' 2
The public reaction to the jury's not guilty verdict'3 in the O.J.
Simpson trial gave rise to the contention that "urban black juries all
too often put race above justice"" and evoked cries of concern and
10. See Page, supra note 8. One executive allegedly stated that he was "still having
trouble with Hannukkah. Now we have Kwanzaa." Eichenwald, supra note 6.
Following the initial release of the tapes, outside investigators hired by Texaco
concluded that the word "niggers" was not used and that the Texaco official actually
said "St. Nicholas." See Peter Fritsch & Allana Sullivan, Texaco Probe Looks at Fate of
Documents, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1996, at A3. In addition, the investigators reported
that the "black jelly beans" comment was a reference to a term used during the com-
pany's diversity program and was not a racial slur. See id. An attorney for the Black
employees responded that the investigators' findings were "an insult.. .This doesn't
impact one iota the racial animus that's all over these tapes and all over [Texaco's
minority] employment practices." Id.
11. Texaco chairman and chief executive officer, Peter I. Bijur, has stated that the
executives' language and comments are "statements that represent attitudes we
hoped and wished had long ago disappeared entirely from the landscape of our
country-and certainly from our company... We believe unequivocally [that] it is
utterly reprehensible to deny another human of his or her self-respect and dignity
because of race, color, religion or sex." Kurt Eichenwald, The Two Faces of Texaco,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1996, § 3, at 1.
12. Page, supra note 8.
13. See Special Report: The Verdict, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, at 37; see also Marc
Cooper, Jury's Still Out, 261 NATION 488, 488 (1995):
The bitter reaction to the O.J. Simpson verdict among whites threatens
to linger as long as the trial itself. You can't channel-surf for more than five
minutes without bumping into a smirking Andy Rooney, an in-
censed Dominick Dunne or a smug Dinesh D'Souza reassuring us there is
such a thing as "rational discrimination." Away from the TV cameras, in the
bowling alleys and bars of suburban San Fernando Valley, the "N-word"
peppers the verdict post-mortems in alarming measure.
14. Michael Lind, Jury Dismissed, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 23, 1995, at 10. In a pro-
vocative article, Paul Butler argues for subversion of the American criminal justice
system through jury nullification. Specifically, Butler contends that criminal conduct
among African Americans "is often a predictable reaction to oppression.... Punish-
ing black people for the fruits of racism is wrong if that punishment is premised on
the idea that it is the black criminal's 'just desserts.' "Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury
Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 680 (1995).
In every case, Butler argues, the African American juror "should be guided by her
view of what is 'just.' " Id. at 715. In violent cases, African American jurors should
consider the case on the basis of the evidence and convict if convinced beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant committed the alleged offense. For nonviolent
crimes like theft or perjury, Butler continues, nullification is an option that jurors
should consider, with no presumption in favor of nullification. For other nonviolent
offenses, including those involving "victimless" crimes, Butler argues for a pre-
sumption in favor of nullification. See id.
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even outrage over the nation's intractable Black 5-White 6 divide. 7
The aftermath of the Simpson trial was characterized by discussions
of the differing perceptions of many Whites and African Americans
of the Rolice and the criminal justice system 8 and the use of the "race
card."
15. The word "Black" is used herein because Blacks (like Latinos, Asians, and
other so-called minorities) "constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require
denotation as a proper noun." Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Re-
trenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988); accord Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1707, 1710 n.3 (1993); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect to
Prevent Integration: Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 1595, 1597 n.8 (1995); Nikki Giovanni, Black is the Noun, in LURE AND
LOATHING, supra note 4, at 113, 122.
16. Although this Article focuses on Blacks and Whites, doing so runs the risk of
"distort[ing] our views of other minority groups [and] also deprives us of compari-
sons that might help us better understand black-white relations, relations between
other minority groups and whites, and relations among minority groups." Daniel A.
Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 893, 893 n.2
(1994); see Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism:
Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial
Society, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863 (1993). As stated by Harlon Dalton:
[T]here are many downsides to viewing a world of color through a lens that
refracts only black and white. A major one is that the Black experience tends
to become the template against which the experiences of all people of color
are measured. Another is that frictions among people of color tend to be ren-
dered invisible.
HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING: CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN BLACKS
AND WHITES 5 (1995). See also Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group
Portraits of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 269 (1995) (noting the
complexity of American race relations and stating that "a black/white division of the
races does not suffice even as a social description, let alone as a recipe for legal
remediation"). While this Article, given its specific purpose, focuses on Blacks and
Whites, the validity of the colorblind thesis is an issue for all persons of color.
17. See Eric Foner, The Great Divide, 261 NATION 487 (1995). A recent poll showed
that 85% of African Americans agreed with the jury's verdict of not guilty while 54%
of Whites disagreed with the verdict. Eighty percent of African Americans thought
the trial was fair and impartial; the corresponding number for Whites was 50%. See
Mark Whitaker, Whites v. Blacks, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, at 28, 30, 34.
For discussions of the issue of racial divisions and the Simpson verdict, see
Randall Kennedy, Is All Discrimination Created Equal?, TIME, Oct. 16, 1995, at 72;
Glenn C. Loury, Not So Black and White: The Two Americas are Actually Converging,
WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1995, at C3.
18. See Randall Kennedy, After the Cheers, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 23, 1995, at 14. The
Mark Fuhrman factor confirmed to many that their deepest fears of police miscon-
duct were in fact true. Research conducted by the Simpson defense team prior to the
selection of the jury "showed that Fuhrman was perhaps the most critical element
that sank the prosecution['s] case .... ." Larry Reibstein, What Went Wrong,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, at 40, 43. Prosecutors relied on Fuhrman's testimony in the
trial even though he had told them in a mock cross-examination that he had made
racist remarks in the past, and even though prosecutors were aware of racist state-
ments made by Fuhrman when he filed for a disability retirement in the early 1980's.
See id.
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Also consider the October 16, 1995 Million Man March on
Washington, D.C. For some, the "day of atonement" was a source of
pride and a day in which African American males united to address
pressing issues facing their community. For others, the march was a
self-serving platform for Louis Farrakhan, an individual they con-
sidered to be anti-Semitic, sexist, homophobic, and "a man whose
presence and power is an affront to all who genuinely seek a color-
blind, and color-just, America."20 Others asked how "this great mo-
ment in American cultural politics was orchestrated by the
demagogic leader of a black fascist sect, while no other nationally
prominent black leader could have pulled it off?"'21 Some considered
the march to be consistent with or, conversely, antithetical to their
understanding of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s call for a colorblind soci-
ety.22 For Anita Hill, bell hooks, Angela Y. Davis, and Patricia J.
A recent study of the California criminal justice system shows that approxi-
mately 40% of Black males in their twenties in California are in prison or on parole
on any particular day. Only 5% of White males in California in their twenties, and
11% of Latino males in that age group, were in the criminal system. The author of the
study, Vincent Schiraldi, attributed the Black male involvement with the criminal
justice system to harsher sentencing laws for crack cocaine use, poverty, the absence
of good jobs and poor education in inner cities, and the growth of prison construc-
tion. See Fox Butterfield, Study Finds a Disparity in Justice for Blacks, N.Y. TIMES
(National Edition), Feb. 13, 1996, at A8.
19. Simpson's attorney, Johnnie Cochran, understood that it would be impossible
to keep race out of the trial. See Sylvester Monroe, Race Man, EMERGE, Dec.-Jan.1996,
at 31, 33. The notion that Cochran improperly played the race card is disputed by
Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Chief Judge Emeritus, Unisted States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit:
If you knew that the most important witness had a history of racism
and hostility against black people, that should have been a relevant factor of
inquiry even if the jury had been all white. If the defendant had been Jewish
and the police officer had a long history of expressed anti-Semitism and hav-
ing planted evidence against innocent persons who were Jewish, I can't
believe that anyone would have been saying that defense counsel was playing
the anti-Semitism card.
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man, THE NEW YORKER,
Oct. 23, 1995, at 56, 59.
20. The Man and the March, NEw REPuBuc, Nov. 6, 1995, at 9; see also Special Re-
port: The Two Faces of Farrakhan, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30, 1995, at 30 (offering a series of
articles questioning whether the Million Man March was an act of self-help or sepa-
ratism); see generally Howard Fineman & Vern E. Smith, An Angry "Charmer,"
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30, 1995, at 32 (profiling the public appeal and life of Louis Farra-
khan).
21. Glenn C. Loury, One Man's March, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 1995, at 18, 21.
22. See Crossfire, (CNN Cable Broadcast, Oct. 17, 1995), available in LEXIS Genfed
Scripts Transcript # 1476, (remarks of Lynne Cheney); Charlie Rose (WNET Broadcast,
Oct. 16, 1995), available in LEXIS Genfed Scripts Transcript # 1487, (remarks of Wil-
liam Bennett, Secretary of Education during the Reagan administration and Drug
Czar during the Bush administration). Cornel West participated in the march not-
withstanding his view that "Minister Farrakhan is white America's worst
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
Williams,23 among others, the exclusion of women from the march
reflected Black male patriarchy and the sacralization of masculin-
ity.
24
If the country's reaction to the Simpson verdict and the Million
Man March were not enough to highlight the nation's continuing
(and arguably expanding) racial chasm, consider the recent publi-
cation of Dinesh D'Souza's The End of Racism.26 D'Souza argues, inter
alia, that race is still the most divisive issue of our time; that African
Americans "continue to show conspicuous evidence of failure" in the
workplace, schools and colleges, and in maintaining intact families
and secure communities;27 that "circumstances of poverty and depri-
vation in which blacks find themselves in America today are not the
cause, but the result, of low intelligence;" 28 that "black culture also
has a vicious, self-defeating, and repellent underside that it is no
longer possible to ignore or euphemise;" 29 and that "African Ameri-
cans seem woefully lacking in the skills needed to compete
effectively in a multiracial society."3° If "blacks can close the civiliza-
tion gap," D'Souza writes, "the race problem in this country is likely
to become insignificant."3' These controversial and derogatory
nightmare." Cornel West, Why I'm Marching in Washington, N.Y. TIMES (National
Edition), Oct. 14, 1995, at 15. Noting his own condemnation of xenophobia, patriar-
chy, homophobia, and anti-Semitism, West posited that the march was part of King's
legacy. King, "the integrationist, had no fear of a black united front and no hatred of
black nationalists." Id. Although he has deep disagreements with Farrakhan, West
believes that the march was about matters much larger than Farrakhan. "I have in
mind the general invisibility of, and indifference to, black sadness, sorrow and social
misery, and the disrespect and disregard in which blacks are held in America and
abroad. We agree on highlighting black suffering." Id.
23. See Patricia J. Williams, Different Drummers Please, Marchers!, 261 NATION 493
(1995) ("I have nothing but misgivings about any venture organized by either Nation
of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan or former N.A.A.C.P. executive director Ben Chavis,
never mind the two of them together.").
24. Gates, supra note 19, at 60. The march's organizing committee urged men to
take their place as the head of their families and the "maintainers" of women and
children, and also urged women to "stay at home" while thanking them for their
patience in "waiting for us to take up our responsibility." Williams, supra note 23, at
493.
25. The post-Simpson verdict and post-Million Man March race relations reveal a
gulf between Black and White worlds and Black and Jewish worlds. See After 0.1. and
the Farrakhan-led Million Man March: Is Healing Possible?, TIKKUN, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at
12.
26. DINESH D'SOuzA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTICULTURAL
SOCIETY (1995).
27. Id. at 6.
28. Id. at 445. According to D'Souza, "large inherited differences in IQ, far from
undermining the case for affirmative action... may actually strengthen it.... [Ihf
blacks cannot compete on a level playing field with whites and Asians, a humane
argument can be made for preferences to artificially elevate their status." Id. at 466.
29. Id. at 486.
30. Id. at 499.
31. Id. at 527.
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statements are made, incredibly, by an individual who espouses
"colorblindness" while simultaneously categorizing and separating
people on the basis of race and color.
The Texaco race discrimination charges, the Simpson trial and
verdict, the Million Man March, and D'Souza's The End of Racism:
these are but a few recent incidents highlighting the perpetual and
problematic color line32 as well as bringing to light American soc-
iety's "integral, permanent, and indestructible component" of rac-
ism.3 3 These and other historical and contemporary developments,
by demonstrating that minorities continue to be subjected to num-
erous forms of harmful discrimination, form the backdrop for this
Article's discussion and ultimate rejection of the colorblind thesis.
This Article focuses on one particular aspect of the colorblind
thesis: the misuse of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s image and legacy by
liberals, neoliberals, conservatives, and neoconservatives3 "who
cheaply invoke Dr. King's words even as they kill the substance and
32. See W.E.B. Du BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK: ESSAYS AND SKETCHES (1996);
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE COLOR LINE: LEGACY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 5
(1993).
33. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM at ix (1992).
34. While necessarily inexact, the terms "liberal," "neoliberal," "conservative,"
and "neoconservative" are widely used today and are applied herein as they are
used in ordinary American political discourse. See generally Ronald K.L. Collins &
David M. Skover, The Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. REv. 189, 195
(1988) (describing a general sociopolitical viewpoint of current American liberalism);
William H. Clune, Courts and Legislatures as Arbitrators of Social Change, 93 YALE L.J.
763, 779 n.87 (1984) (book review) (noting that purist liberals and conservatives de-
fine themselves in terms of ideological and philosophical positions on the
appropriateness of government action, adding that neoliberals and neoconservatives
generally support or oppose government intervention on grounds of cost conscious-
ness and perceived results of social programs); WINANT, supra note 4, at 27 (stating
that the chief concern of neoconservatism is the "threat to political and cultural tra-
ditions it discerned in racial minority demands for 'group rights,' or 'equality of
result' "). In the colorblind debate, colorblind conservatism looks to culture as the
key factor in explaining the plight of many African Americans and people of color,
while colorblind neoliberalism looks to class as the key explanatory factor. See
STEPHEN STEINBERG, TURNING BACK: THE RETREAT FROM RACIAL JUSTICE IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT AND POLCY 140 (1995).
The current conservative call for colorblindness is seen in the platitude that
our Constitution is colorblind. See James G. Wilson, Constraints of Power: The Consti-
tutional Opinions of Judges Scalia, Bork, Posner, Easterbrook, and Winter, 40 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 1171, 1263 (1986). That platitude is part of the overall conservative agenda in
which government is to be colorblind and minimalistic. See Lani Guinier, Lines in the
Sand, 72 TEX. L. REv. 315, 340 (1993) (reviewing CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW:
ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT (1991)).
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spirit of his radical message." 3 The campaign supporting the adop-
tion of Proposition 209, the California Civil Rights Initiative
("CCRI"), 36 directly illustrates the misappropriation of King's legacy.
Supporters of this anti-affirmative action proposal which calls for
racial neutrality and a colorblind America, regularly invoked King's
37name, suggesting that he would have embraced such a measure.
The California Republican Party prepared a television commercial in
support of the proposition that included King's reference to his
dream of a colorblind and a content-of-character world.3' After op-
ponents of the measure and civil rights leaders, including Coretta
Scott King,39 denounced such use of King's words,4 complaining
that King's legacy was being distorted, the "I Have a Dream" seg-
ment was removed from the commercial.41 The dangers of this
misappropriation of "King-as-icon" and his legacy are illustrative of
the ways in which facts and historical figures are distorted and in
which iconolatry is substituted for reasoned argument. These dan-
gers, as well as the need to identify and refute inaccurate distortions
of history, are discussed in this Article.
35. West, supra note 22, at 15; see also CLARENCE PAGE, SHOWING MY COLOR:
IMPOLITE ESSAYS ON RACE AND IDENTITY 5 (1996) (suggesting that the words of King
have been perverted to support the colorblind approach to law): see generally Stewart
Bums, Martin Luther King, Jr. 's Empowering Legacy, TIKKUN, Mar. 1993, at 49
("Conservatives praise King's dream of a color-blind society that they contend is
violated by affirmative action and 'reverse discrimination.' ").
36. Proposition 209 provides, inter alia, that the "state shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting." Bill Jones, Secretary of State, Proposition
209, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION, Nov. 5, 1996.
For discussions of Proposition 209 and its constitutionality, see Vikram D.
Amar and Evan H. Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal Political Burdens, and the
CCRI, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1115 (1996); Robert S. Chang, Reverse Racism!: Af-
firmative Action, the Family, and the Dream That Is America, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
1115 (1996); Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity, and the
California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 1135 (1996).
37. See Gotanda, supra note 36.
38. See Dave Lesher, Prop. 209 Backer Defends Use of King in Ad, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
24, 1996, at A3.
39. See Coretta Scott King, Man of his Word, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1996, § 4, at 15
(arguing that King's words have been "distorted by supporters of the California Civil
Rights Initiative...").
40. See id.; Dave Lesher, GOP Pulls King Segment from TV Ad for Prop. 209, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 1996, at A26.
41. See Lesher, supra note 40. Ward Connerly, the African American campaign
chairman of the Proposition 209 movement, disagreed with those who argued that
King's words were being distorted. As he stated: "I think it is outrageous for Jesse
Jackson and all of those... from the 1960's, to somehow suggest that it is inappro-
priate for any of us to use Dr. King's memory .... He belongs to all of us." Lesher,
supra note 38, at A3.
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I. COLORBLIND OR COLOR-AWARE?4 2
Should law and public policy be colorblind? What are the tan-
gible effects of applying a purportedly colorblind analysis in a world
in which race and color play an undeniable role in the quantity and
quality of opportunities for people of all races? Would colorblind-
ness perpetuate the often crippling effects of past and present
discrimination? Can those who have benefited from the anticom-
petitive advantages of de jure and de facto discrimination validly
claim that colorblindness should now be the moral and legal norm?
A call for colorblindness seems peculiar in a nation wherein race
has been the most critical, and the most powerful [issue], in
effecting political change. Race has crystallized and
provided a focus for values conflicts, for cultural conflicts,
and for interest conflicts-conflicts over subjects as diverse
as social welfare spending, neighborhood schooling, the
distribution of the tax burden, criminal violence, sexual
conduct, family structure, political competition, and union
membership....
Whether race-consciousness is improper, illegal, or unconstitu-
tional has been the focus of judicial' and scholarly 4 debate between
42. The term "color-awareness" contrasts effectively with "colorblindness." "It
reflects the reality that most people who have grown up in the U.S. are aware of or
want to know the color of others." Bryan K. Fair, Foreword: Rethinking the Colorblind-
ness Model, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 3 n.15 (1993).
43. THOMAS B. EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF
RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 5 (1992).
44. Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States have argued for and
against the colorblind principle. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2598 (1994)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that "assumptions upon which our vote dilution
decisions have been based should be repugnant to any nation that strives for the
ideal of a color-blind Constitution"); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (noting
the appellants' invocation of a color-blind Constitution, the Court stated that it "has
never held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible in all circum-
stances"); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "only a social emergency rising to the level of imminent dan-
ger to life and limb . . .can justify an exception to the principle embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment that '[olur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows
nor tolerates classes among citizens' "); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 677
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was "designed to establish a color-blind and gender-blind workplace"); United States
v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 194 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (indicating that a court's
consideration of race is unavoidable where that court must order relief and remedies
in a race discrimination case); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 482 (1980)
(rejecting the argument that in the remedial context Congress must act in a "wholly
'color-blind' fashion"); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 238
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting Senate sponsor's statement that the bill that
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those who contend that the Constitution and laws should be applied
in a colorblind fashion, and those who reject that notion in favor of
color-aware application of our laws.
A. Colorblindness
The colorblind thesis embodies one facet of several broad sub-
jects of public policy including: equality, the meaning and
application of an antidiscrimination principle, societal conceptions
of permissible private/public choices, and the definition of imper-
missible discrimination. Proponents of colorblindness posit that
became Title VII was colorblind); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) (discussing the limits of a state's use of suspect racial classifications and
holding, inter alia, that a medical school's preferential admissions program was in-
valid under the Fourteenth Amendment); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 287-88
(1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (claiming that the Constitution is color blind); id. at
342 n.42 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment is color
blind "in the sense that it outlaws all state laws which discriminate merely on ac-
count of color"); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("Our Constitution is color-blind..."); see also john a. powell, An Agenda for the Post-
Civil Rights Era, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 889, 900 n.55 (1995) (noting that the word
"colorblind" has appeared in twenty Supreme Court opinions since 1945 and that the
word "has become synonymous with the white or non-white position in Supreme
Court jurisprudence").
In the current Court, the colorblind ideal has been sanctioned by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, all of whom "have firmly
committed themselves to the proposition that government can almost never classify
citizens on the basis of race." Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, NEW REPUBLIC,
July 31, 1995, at 19.
45. For discussions of the colorblind debate, see BRYAN K. FAIR, NOTES OF A
RACIAL CASTE BABY: COLOR BLINDNESS AND THE END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
(forthcoming 1997); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996); ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION
(1992); IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(1996); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1060 (1991); William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1979); Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the An-
tidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); Kimberl5 Williams Crenshaw,
Foreword: Toward a Race-Consciousness Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK
L.J. 1 (1989); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of
Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 162
(1994); Fair, supra note 42; Bryan K. Fair, The Acontextual Illusion of a Color-Blind Con-
stitution, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 343 (1994) (book review); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our
Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991); Lino A. Graglia, Racial Prefer-
ences, Quotas, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1117 (1992); Lani
Guinier, (E)racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 109 (1994);
Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 791 (1996); Althornia Steele,
The Myth of a Color-Blind Nation: An Affirmation of Professor Derrick Bell's Insight into
the Permanence of Racism in Society, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 589 (1993); David A. Strauss,
The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99; Laurence H. Tribe, In What Vision of
the Constitution Must the Law be Color-Blind?, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 201 (1986);
Walter E. Williams, False Civil Rights Vision and Contempt for Rule of Law, 79 GEO. L.J.
1777 (1991).
[VOL. 2:101
Misusing Martin Luther King, Jr. 's Legacy
"[cilassifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect
racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns; the race, not the
person, dictates the category. The lesson to be drawn "from cen-
turies of race-based laws, traditions, and customs designed to
subordinate blacks is that race should seldom be used as a criterion
for decisionmaking, even when its use purports to make restitution
for the present effects of a racist past., 47 In the constitutional context,
the Supreme Court, cognizant of the likelihood of prejudice in race-
conscious classifications, has subjected such classifications to the
strictest of scrutiny and has determined that, to pass constitutional
muster, the classification must be justified by a compelling iovern-
mental interest necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose.
Colorblindness is a policy choice and not, as many assert, a
moral principle.49 Proponents of colorblindness include those who
maintain that "[i]f it was wrong to discriminate against black people
on the basis of their color,... it must be equally wrong to discrimi-
nate in favor of black people on the basis of their color."' ° The
mantra of the proponents of colorblindness "is Justice John Marshall
Harlan's aphorism.. .that 'our Constitution is color-blind.' .... Some
advocates of colorblindness believe that "merit" is the ultimate con-
ception of colorblindness and that "people are treated unjustly and
discriminated against 'when their merit is assessed according to
their status rather than according to the value of their traits or prod-
ucts.' ,,52 According to that view, any consideration of race "remains
46. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
47. Anthony E. Cook, The Death of God in American Pragmatism and Realism: Resur-
recting the Value of Love in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 82 GEO. L.J. 1431, 1512 (1994).
Cook argues that colorblindness has been exploited "as a camouflage for the preser-
vation of elite white privilege." Id.
48. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432; accord Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
49. See Culp, supra note 45, at 171 ("[T]he colorblind principle in modem consti-
tutional discourse must be seen as a policy argument and not a moral precept.").
50. BERNARD R. BOXILL, BLACKS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 1 (rev. ed. 1992) (discussing
the argument of advocates of colorblindness).
51. Id. In his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice Harlan stated, "[o]ur Constitu-
tion is color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." 163 U.S.
537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan's dissent from the Court's validation
of "separate-but-equal" railroad accommodations often is cited as the genesis of ju-
dicial recognition of the colorblind thesis. His opinion goes further, however, and
expresses his support for White hegemony:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And
so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I
doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage
and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.
Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
52. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-
Semitic?, 83 CAL. L. REV. 853, 858-59 (1995) (footnote omitted).
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a regrettable if necessary deviation from the ideal of a color-blind
meritocratic system."53
In the aftermath of the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Brown v. Board of Education,4 "colorblindness" was a dominant
theme and slogan of the Civil Rights Movement."' Brown was viewed
as a major victory of the Civil Rights Movement, helping to establish
"colorblindness as the central principle of the law governing racial
discrimination. ,
56
The colorblindness thesis dictates that the immutable character-
istic of skin color is meaningless.57
The colorblind position supports a legal skepticism of
racial categories and racial classifications. ... The apparent
goal is to treat everyone equally without reference to
context, situation, history or culture. On its face, the
position is ostensibly neutral, in keeping with the dictates
of procedural fairness and formal equality ...""
Again, the aphorism of colorblindness conveys the message that the
"essence of the obligation not to discriminate is for the pertinent de-
cision-maker not to take color or race-any color or race-into
consideration. The effect of blindness is to treat all colors as norma-
tive equivalents....
53. Id. at 859.
54. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
55. See powell, supra note 44, at 893.
56. Strauss, supra note 45, at 99; see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Law of Civil
Rights and the Dangers of Separatism in Multicultural America, 47 STAN. L. REv. 993,
997-98 (1995) ("Brown stands for the premise that race is not the salient characteristic
of an American citizen or even a relevant characteristic for public decisionmaking at
all.").
However, Professor David Strauss argues that the colorblindness principle
espoused by the Court in Brown did not preclude race-consciousness. The
"prohibition against discrimination established by Brown is not rooted in colorblind-
ness at all. Instead, it is, like affirmative action, deeply race-conscious. . .[and]
reflects a deliberate decision to treat blacks differently from other groups, even at the
expense of innocent whites." Strauss, supra note 45, at 100; see also id. at 114 ("[Wle
do not have a choice between colorblindness and race-consciousness; we only have a
choice between different forms of race-consciousness.").
57. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 IARV. L. REV. 1709, 1768
(1993). Harris argues that defining race as simply color and therefore meaningless "is
as subordinating as defining race to be scientifically determinative of inherent defi-
ciency. The old definition creates a false linkage between race and inferiority; the
new definition denies a real linkage between race and oppression under systematic
white supremacy. Distorting and denying reality, both definitions support race sub-
ordination."
58. powell, supra note 44, at 892 (disputing the notion that colorblindness is neu-
tral in effect and arguing that it treats differently situated persons similarly).
59. Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 236
(1971).
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Important questions concerning the connection of race and cul-
ture and the effects thereof on the lives of African Americans would
not be addressed in a colorblind regime, for "colorblindness permits
us to avoid any discussion of the morality or justice of assimilation,
nationalism, or cultural differences. Instead, its proponents simply
assert that justice and morality are vested within colorblindness,"6
and that a colorblind and race-neutral approach "does not suffer the
drawbacks of traditional race-based action such as injustice to dis-
preferred groups, stigmatization of preferred ones, and flagrant race
consciousness.'
B. Color-Awareness
For those who are color-aware, the "ideal of a society in which
race is as insignificant a factor as eye color" has an initial but illusory
appeal.62 In contrast to advocates of colorblindness, those who are
color-aware do not believe that true colorblindness can ever exist.
Rather, people who are color-aware view efforts to implement a
colorblind regime as a form of race subordination that fails to
acknowledge White hegemony even while fostering it.6 Of course,
color-awareness of the subordinating variety has existed throughout
the nation's history.64 Slavery, the legally enforced subordination of
African Americans, and the effects of ,past and present discrimina-
tion are harmful and powerful forces. Proponents of color-aware-
ness do not deny these overwhelming instances where color-
awareness has resulted in the subjugation of people of color.
60. Culp, supra note 45, at 163.
61. Wilkinson, supra note 56, at 1014 (footnote omitted).
62. Strauss, supra note 45, at 117. See also DALTON, supra note 16, at 65 ("[E]ye
color and ear contours have little social significance in my daily comings and goings
and do not play much of a role in my aesthetic judgments."); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was
Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory
Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 970-71 (1993) ("Race is undeniably a powerful determi-
nant of social status and so is always noticed, in a way that eye color, for example,
may not be.").
63. See Gotanda, supra note 45, at 34; Harris, supra note 15, at 1768. A commit-
ment to colorblindness can also be fleeting and self-serving. Southern state
legislatures seeking readmission to the United States after the Civil War gained re-
admission with colorblind constitutions. Having done so via a colorblind regime,
most of those states then enacted laws permitting or requiring segregated schools.
See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REv.
947, 964-65 (1995). In that circumstance, colorblindness facilitated White hegemony
without a corresponding protection or promotion of the rights of African Americans.
64. See BOXILL, supra note 50 at 11. For example, the aim of color-aware Jim Crow
policies was the subordination of Blacks. See id.
65. See Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII's Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theo-
ries, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 375-78 (1995).
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However, in today's society, where the baseline is not colorblind, the
laws and Constitution need to be applied in a more remedial color-
aware manner to address both the imbalance and the reality that
racial and ethnic biases still exist.
Color-awareness advocates argue that "racial justice and
colorblindness are not the same thing. Race-neutral policies are only
as good or bad as the results they produce .... [T]o assume that
ignoring race in making social policy will bring about justice or
achieve morality is legal fantasy."' Moreover, people of color may
not want to be treated as raceless or colorless, since so much of who
they are is the result of growing up as a person of color in America.67
To "e-race" individuals is to deny them a meaningful identity and
separate them from their own flesh and blood."
Adoption of a colorblind approach would permit society in
general and courts in particular to avoid accounting for and grap-
pling with fundamental issues raised by past and present
discrimination. Color-awareness, rather than sidestepping these is-
sues, posits that it is permissible and desirable to take race and color
into account when remedying the present effects of past racial dis-
crimination. In that regard, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196469
is a color-aware statute.70
While Title VII is colorblind in the sense that an employer cov-
ered by the statute may not lawfully consider a person's race in
making employment decisions, the statute effectively results in
color-aware conduct on the part of employers. For example, in pat-
tern and practice disparate treatment suits, the statistical
"underrepresentation" of Blacks can raise the inference of intentional
discrimination by employers7' which may cause an employer to take
steps to limit its vulnerability to such legal claims by being aware of
the racial demographics of its work force and by taking steps to ad-
dress any underrepresentation of African Americans. Also, statistical
underrepresentation in an employer's work force can be critical in
disparate impact cases wherein a statutory violation can be found
even in the absence of an unlawful employer motive. In order to
avoid exposure to liability from a disparate impact suit an employer
66. Culp, supra note 45, at 162-63.
67. See DALTON, supra note 16, at 47.
68. See id. at 72.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (West 1996). Generally, Title VII prohibits employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
70. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., The Michael Jackson Pill: Equality, Race, and Cul-
ture, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2613, 2620 (1994)("The improper use of race and the other
categories alone triggers the protective mechanisms of Title VII and other civil rights
statutes.").
71. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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may seek to maintain a racially "representative" work force which
effectively requires that it act in a race-conscious manner.
72
Color-awareness advocates thus believe that color-awareness
comports with a reality in which a person's race and color are ob-
servable characteristics; after all, we all can distinguish among
colors.7 ' Even the visually colorblind, who may not be able to differ-
entiate colors, can distinguish between races.
In sum, color-awareness best describes and most accurately
captures the historical, contemporary, contextual, and nuanced di-
mensions of this nation's history and color line. As stated in Palmore
v. Sidoti,74 it "would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic
prejudices do not exist or that all manifestations of those prejudices
have been eliminated." 7 Those who are color-aware are more likely
to see the full dimensions of racial caste and subordination than are
those who limit their legal and social inquiries to misguided at-
tempts at achieving a purportedly neutral colorblind position. To
borrow the words of Stanley Crouch, colorblindness is:
a fiction that shrinks our understanding of this country by
avoiding the evidence of those things seen just about
everywhere-in our politics, our mass media, on our
menus, our campuses, our showroom floors, in our
department stores, our malls, our bureaucracies, the
lobbies of our hotels, our movie theaters, at our airports,S• 76
on our highways, in our advertising.
Color-awareness is not similarly flawed.
72. See Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate
Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1497 (1996)
(noting that fear of liability gives employers an incentive to change hiring practices);
Robert Belton, The Dismantling of Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and the Future of Title
VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 223 (1990) (observing
that to reduce the likelihood of a disparate impact suit many employers adopted
race-conscious measures such as affirmative action plans); Alfred W. Blumrosen, The
Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 6
(1987).
73. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr. et al., A New Journal of Color in a "Colorblind"
World: Race and Community, 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 1, 3-4 (1994) (discussing the
scientific understanding of colorblindness); George Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its
Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117, 127 (1995) ("Someone who is colorblind cannot dis-
criminate among colors .....
74. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
75. Id. at 433; see also id. ("The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but
neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but
the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.").
76. STANLEY CROUCH, THE ALL-AMERICAN SKIN GAME, OR THE DECOY OF RACE
119 (1995) (reviewing BARBARA PROEST SOLOMON, SMALL HEARTS IN THE CITY
(1992)).
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II. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.'S COLOR-AWARENESS
The most significant issue to be addressed by this essay is how
Martin Luther King, Jr.'s legacy has been misused in support of the
colorblind thesis. 7 As noted in the prologue, King dreamed that one
day his "four little children [would] live in a nation where they will
not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their
character." This statement has been wrenched out of the social and
political context in which King lived and died and has been misap-
propriated by some proponents of colorblindness who erroneously
argue that "if colorblindness was good enough for Martin Luther
King.. .then it ought to be good enough for a society that still aspires
to the movement's goals of equality and fair treatment."79 This incor-
rect and ahistorical perversion of King's statement distorts his actual
views and legacy, and illustrates the dangers of the misuse of
"acontextual snippets. "8°
A. King's Black Liberation Theology and Race Consciousness
King "filtered his theoretical deconstruction of hegemonic the-
ologies through his knowledge of the history and experience of
oppression, and thereby made that theoretical deconstruction richer,
more contextual, and ready to engage the existential realities of op-
pression."81 That theoretical deconstruction grew out of King's
812
religious views as well as his leadership role within an undeniably
"colored" institution-the African American church.3 The Black
77. See Gotanda, supra note 45, at 16-17.
78. TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 1, at 219.
79. Culp, supra note 45, at 163 (noting the flaws inherent in decontextualizing
King's views). See infra Part III.A. and accompanying notes.
80. Stephen L. Carter, Foreword to LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY:
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY at xviii (1994).
81. Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 1014 (1990).
82. See Burns, supra note 35, at 50. Bums explained that
[King's] deep faith in God that was rooted in the Black Baptist tradition sus-
tained his activism. He believed in a loving, personal divinity that acted in
history for human betterment, offering "cosmic companionship" for op-
pressed peoples in their struggles for freedom, and that upheld universal
values of right and wrong .... The fourth generation of Baptist preachers, his
great-grandfather as a slave preacher, King felt called to serve both as a
leader of the Black community and as a prophet conveying divine purposes
to all humanity. His leadership of the Black freedom movement was an-
chored in a prophetic mission to reconcile the demands of justice with the
ethic of love, the latter the "supreme unifying principle of life."
83. See Cook, supra note 81, at 1023; see also Culp, supra note 45, at 164 n.6
(discussing the race-conscious ways in which the Southern Christian Leadership
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church was more than just a place of worship; it was "also a bulletin
board to a people who owned no organs of communications, a credit
union to those without banks, and even a kind of people's court." 8
Working from the base of Black liberation theology" and within an
"openly and frankly religious" Civil Rights Movement,8 King
"advocated redemptive suffering of African Americans through
their own bloodshed."7 King also sought to bring into being a com-
munity of racial equality,8 while fighting against the nation's racial
caste system."
B. King's "Dream" and "Nightmare" Speeches
On August 28, 1963, King gave the keynote address of the Civil
Rights March on Washington, D.C.-his well-known "I Have a
Dream" speech.9° Delivering the speech at the Lincoln Memorial,
King began by noting President Abraham Lincoln's signing of the
Emancipation Proclamation: "This momentous decree came as a
great beacon light of hope to millions of Negro slaves who had been
seared in the flames of withering injustice. It came as a joyous day-
break to end the long night of their captivity."9' One hundred years
after the signing of the Proclamation, however, King stated that
the Negro is still not free; one hundred years later, the life
of the Negro is still sadly crippled by the manacles of
segregation and the chains of discrimination; one hundred
years later, the Negro lives on a lonely island of poverty in
the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity; one
Conference, which King helped found, "attempted to use the black church as a po-
litical base for change").
84. TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1945-63,
at 3 (1988).
85. See BELL HOOKS, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RACISM 57 (1995) ("The black church
has always been a place in the United States where African Americans have learned
oppositional ways of thinking that enhance our capacity to survive and flourish.
Black liberation theology always intervened in any tendency to elevate humans to
the status of all-powerful beings.").
86. STEPHEN L. CARTER, CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 227 (1993).
87. MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, MAKING MALCOLM: THE MYTH AND MEANING OF
MALCOLM X, at 9 (1995).
88. See id. at 26.
89. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2429 (1994)
(noting that a caste system turns race or some other highly visible and irrelevant
characteristic and difference into political and social disadvantages without good
reason).
90. See TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 1, at 217.
91. Id.
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
hundred years later, the Negro is still languished in the
corners of American society and finds himself in exile in
his own land.92
America defaulted on its promise to African Americans of life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, King continued, and had
"given the Negro people a bad check: a check which has come back
marked 'insufficient funds'. . . And so we have come to cash this
check, a check that will give us upon demand the riches of freedom
and the security of justice."93 Referring to the "sweltering summer of
the Negro's legitimate discontent," King declared that there would
neither be rest nor tranquillity in America until Blacks were granted
their rights of citizenship. 94 Nor would African Americans be satis-
fied as long as they were the victims of police brutality, were
deprived of their dignity by "whites only" signs, or were subjected
to injustices in America.
King then turned to the dream aspect of his speech. Among
those dreams was the following: "I have a dream my four little chil-
dren will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by
the color of their skin but by the content of their character .... ,9 He
expressed his hope that in Alabama, "with its vicious racists, with its
governor having his lips dripping with the words of interposition
and nullification... little black boys and little black girls will be able
to join hands with little white boys and white girls as sisters and
",97brothers....
King's "I Have a Dream" speech arguably reflects his color-
awareness. His recognition of the fact that African Americans were
subjected to injustice and to the most base discrimination in every
aspect of their lives because they were African Americans was cer-
tainly race-conscious. His dream and hope that Black children and
White children would be able to join hands was race-conscious both
in the identification of the discrimination that kept them apart and
in the desire for an integrated future. His awareness of and objection
to harsh racial realities, which were woven into the very fabric of his
message, arguably demonstrated that King was color-aware.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 217-18.
95. See id. at 218-19.
96. Id. at 219.
97. Id. King referred to Alabama governor George Wallace and Wallace's adher-
ence to the interposition doctrine. Under that doctrine, states would have the
constitutional authority to "interpose" themselves between the federal government
and the state's citizens, thereby giving states "the power to block federal judicial
decisions and federal law." DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE
WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 86-87, 163 (1995).
[VOL. 2:101
FALL 1996] Misusing Martin Luther King, Jr. 's Legacy
Furthermore, statements King made after his "I Have a Dream"
speech more clearly suggest that his call for a transformative change
in American society was color-aware.
In 1965, following the Watts riots, King began to doubt that
Whites were willing to work for a racially just society.8 Four years
after the "I Have a Dream" speech, King delivered a Christmas Eve
sermon at the Ebenezer Baptist Church. During that sermon,
referring to his 1963 speech, King stated "[tioward the end of that
afternoon, I tried to talk to the nation about a dream I had had, and I
must confess to you today that not long after talking about that
dream I started seeing it turn into a nightmare."9 The dream turned
into a nightmare when four Black children were killed in the
bombing of a Birmingham, Alabama church.ln The dream turned
into a nightmare as he "moved through the ghettos of the nation and
saw [his] black brothers and sisters perishing on a lonely island of
poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity, and saw
the nation doing nothing to grapple with the Negroes' problem of
poverty." 0' Notwithstanding his "deferred dreams [and] blasted
hopes,"'12 King still dreamed that "one day every Negro in this
country, every colored person in the world, will be judged on the
basis of the content of his character rather than the color of his skin,
and every man will respect the dignity and worth of human
responsibility.' 1 3 When viewed in light of other statements made by
King, this speech evidences his color-aware approach to eliminating
the subordination of minorities in the U.S.
C. King's Other Color-Aware Statements and Views
King's color-awareness is revealed in other speeches and writ-
ings. For instance, in his "Letter from Birmingham Jail," he
expressed his grave disappointment, not with the Ku Klux Klan or
the White Citizen Council, but with the White moderate devoted
more to order than to justice. °4 In another speech he recounted an
98. See MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, BETWEEN GOD AND GANGSTA RAP: BEARING
WITNESS TO BLACK CULTURE 99 (1996).
99. TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 1, at 257.
100. Between 1948 and 1965, over 200 Black churches and homes, as well as
synagogues, were bombed in the south. See CARTER, supra note 97, at 115. Four chil-
dren were killed by a bomb detonated at the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in
Birmingham, Alabama. See id. at 276.
101. Id. at 257.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 258.
104. See id. at 295. In the letter, King wrote that he was gravely disappointed with
the White moderate:
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incident during the Montgomery bus boycott in which a White per-
son in Montgomery, Alabama told King that Montgomery had been
a peaceful community,' °5 that "you people [Blacks] have started this
movement and boycott, and it has done so much to disturb race re-
lations, and we just don't love the Negro like we used to love them,
because you have destroyed the harmony and the peace that we
once had in race relations." 10 6 King responded that Blacks had never
had peace in the South, arguing that they were seeking a positive
peace with an aim at achieving complete integration into American
life, rather than a nominal integration which was little more than
token democracy. 7
Was King opposed to explicitly race-conscious and color-aware
laws and policies? In a 1965 interview, he was asked whether a pro-
posal for a multi-billion dollar program providing preferential
treatment for Blacks or any other minority group was fair. King's
answer merits full quotation:
I do indeed. Can any fair-minded citizen deny that the
Negro has been deprived? Few people reflect that for two
centuries the Negro was enslaved, and robbed of any
wages-potential accrued wealth which would have been
the legacy of his descendants. All of America's wealth
today could not adequately compensate its Negroes for his
centuries of exploitation and humiliation....'0'
Accordingly, King's support for affirmative action and the color-
awareness of his views cannot be doubted.'09 His response to the
question of the fairness of affirmative action could not be more di-
rect or explicit-King believed that affirmative action was
I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great
stumbling block in the stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen
Counciler or the Ku Klux Kanner, but the white moderate who is more de-
voted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the
absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who
constantly says, "I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I can't agree with
your methods of direct action;" who paternalistically feels that he can set the
timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by the myth of time and who
constantly advised the Negro to wait until a "more convenient season." Shal-
low understanding from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute
misunderstanding from people of ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much
more bewildering than outright rejection.
105. See generally DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE FIFTIES 539-63 (1993).
106. TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 1, at 50.
107. See id. at 50, 51.
108. Id. at 367.
109. See Cass R. Sunstein, True Lies, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 25, 1995, at 37, 40 (noting
the "pervasive but utterly false claim that Martin Luther King, Jr. was an opponent of
race-conscious affirmative action policies. King strongly supported such policies").
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appropriate given the centuries of slavery and the massive theft suf-
fered by African Americans at the hands of those who oppressed
them.
In his last presidential address to the Southern Christian Lead-
ership Conference, King called for the Negro to "boldly throw off the
manacles of self-abnegation" and to stand up and say, "I'm black
and I'm beautiful," a self-affirmation "made compelling by the white
man's crimes against him."1 As articulated by Kwame Toure (n~e
Stokley Carmichael) and Charles Hamilton, Black Power meant that
"black people must lead and run their own organizations. Only
black people can convey the revolutionary idea-and it is a revolu-
tionary idea-that black people are able to do things themselves....
They must achieve self-identity and self-determination in order to
have their daily needs met.'"" Thus, "black organizations should be
black-led and essentially black-staffed, with policy being made by
black people.',1 2 It cannot be denied that this movement was explic-
itly color-aware. "Many have come seeing 'no difference in color,'
they have become 'color blind.' But at this time and in this land,
color is a factor and we should not overlook or deny this. The black
organizations do not need this kind of idealism, which borders on
paternalism."
' 1
3
King embraced some of these aspirations of the Black Power
movement, particularly the call for African Americans to amass po-
litical and economic strength to achieve their goals.14 Developing
110. TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 1, at 246.
111. STOKLEY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE
POLrIcS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 46 (1967). For Toure and Hamilton, Black Power
was about "black people taking care of business-the business of and for black peo-
ple." Id. at vii. Vast segments of Black communities
are beginning to recognize the need to assert their own definitions, to reclaim
their history, their culture; to create their own sense of community and to-
getherness. There is a growing resentment of the word 'Negro,' for example,
because this term is the invention of our oppressor; it is his image of us that
he describes. Many blacks are now calling themselves African-Americans,
Afro-Americans or black people because that is our image of ourselves.
Id. at 37. Toure and Hamilton also called for group solidarity as the route to social
and political viability and cited the political solidarity of Italian Americans and Irish
Americans as examples of the ways in which groups remembered their roots. See id.
at 44-45.
112. Id. at83.
113. Id.; see also id. ("America was first and foremost a racist society, and any
redistribution or legal reforms that failed to be race-specific would end up benefiting
white groups more than Blacks.").
114. See ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 116 (1995); TESTAMENT OF
HOPE, supra note 1, at 577; see also id. at 582 (noting that the positive aspects of Black
Power "are compatible with what we have sought to do in the civil rights movement
all along without the slogan ..."); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J.
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political awareness and strength and electing Blacks to key political
positions was, in King's view, "a positive and legitimate call to ac-
tion that we in the civil rights movement have sought to follow all
along and which we must intensify in the future." 5 King did not
equate Black Power with Black racism:
It is inaccurate to refer to Black Power as racism in reverse.
• . .Racism is a doctrine of the congenital inferiority and
worthlessness of a people. While a few angry proponents
of Black Power have, in moments of bitterness, made wild
statements that come close to this kind of racism, the major
proponents of Black Power have never contended that the
white man is innately worthless."'
This is not to say that King agreed with all of the tenets of the Black
Power movement, for he clearly did not.'17 However, his acceptance
and agreement with some aspects of Black Power illustrate his color-
awareness.
Ten days before he was assassinated, King suggested to the
convention of the Rabbinical Assembly that "temporary segregation"
may have been necessary to prevent the loss of Black economic
power which may have resulted from complete integration.18 In his
last speech, given in Memphis, Tennessee on April 3, 1968, King
758, 789 n.63 (observing that King saw positive aspects to the concept of Black Power
in terms of building racial pride and solidarity in politics and economics).
115. TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 1, at 578.
116. Id.at585.
117. King did not agree with what he termed the "negative values" of Black
Power, arguing that it was a "nihilistic philosophy born out of the conviction that the
Negro can't win." Id. at 582. In his view, the ultimate contribution of the Black Power
movement was that the movement was
the most revolutionary wing of the social revolution taking place in the
United States. Yet it rejects the one thing that keeps the fire of revolutions
burning: the ever-present flame of hope. When hope dies, a revolution degen-
erates into an undiscriminating catchall for evanescent and futile gestures.
The Negro cannot entrust his destiny to a philosophy nourished solely on de-
spair, to a slogan than cannot be implemented into a program.
Id. at 583. Furthermore, King stated, the weakness of Black Power was its failure to
see that Blacks needed Whites and that Whites needed Blacks:
However much we may try to romanticize the slogan, there is no sepa-
rate black path to power and fulfillment that does not intersect white paths,
and there is no separate white path to power and fulfillment, short of social
disaster, that does not share that power with black aspirations for freedom
and human dignity. We are bound together in a single garment of destiny.
The language, the cultural patterns, the music, the material prosperity and
even the food of America are an amalgam of black and white.
Id. at 588; see also FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 114, at 116-17 (discussing King's problems
with the Black Power movement).
118. DYSON, supra note 98, at 99.
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urged Blacks to anchor direct action with the power of economic
withdrawal. If fair treatment by businesses was not forthcoming,
Blacks should withdraw their economic support from such busi-
nesses. King called on Blacks to support Black businesses: "[T]ake
your money out of the banks downtown and deposit your money in
Tri-State Bank-we want a 'bank-in' movement in Memphis....
You have six or seven black insurance companies in Memphis. Take
out your insurance there. We want to have an 'insurance-in.' "119
A King essay published after his assassination indicted White
America for its "ingrained and tenacious racism." 20 King said that
many Whites could not understand why Blacks did not intend to
remain at the bottom of the economic structure-"they cannot un-
derstand why a porter or a housemaid would dare dream of a day
when his work will be more useful, more remunerative and a path-
way to rising opportunity. This incomprehension is a heavy burden
in our efforts to win white allies for the long struggle.' 2'
As described in this section, in many significant respects King
was race-conscious and color-aware; indeed, the mere mention of his
name brings to mind issues of color-awareness and African Ameri-
can (as well as universal) rights.'2 King spoke "not abstractly but in
a particular context at a particular historical moment, and he meant
to make a particular historical point, one very much connected to
issues of lower caste status."' 3 Given that context, one cannot fairly
derive a colorblind principle from King's total message and phi-
losophy. Such a derivation could only be achieved by omissions,
distortions, simplification, acontextuality, and an overall lack of
familiarity with King's views.
119. TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 1, at 283.
120. Id. at 315.
121. Id. at 316.
122. The color-awareness connected with King's name can have different dimen-
sions. For example, Black residents of Hackensack, New Jersey opposed renaming a
street in their community after King. Why? They feared that doing so would "signal
to 'anyone who read the phone book' that it was a black neighborhood. It was feared
that no white person would ever want to live there and property values would drop:
'It stigmatizes an area.' " PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS:
DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR 118 (1991) (quoting Michael Winerip, A City Struggles
Over an Honor for Dr. King, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1988, at B1). When the New YorkCity
Council changed 125th Street in Harlem to Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard, some
Blacks (feeling that King was a White choice) responded by renaming Lenox Avenue
after Malcolm X. See ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 63 (1992).
123. Cass R. Sunstein, What the Civil Rights Movement Was and Wasn't (With Notes
on Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X), 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 191, 200-01.
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
III. MISUSING KING'S LEGACY
A. Examples
Notwithstanding King's race-consciousness and color-
awareness, "people have created a mythic Martin Luther King, Jr.,
and associated him with a fictional notion of colorblindness."" Op-
ponents of affirmative action, for example, have erroneously cited
and used King's legacy as an endorsement of colorblindness, with
particular reliance on King's dream that persons would one day be
judged by the content of their character and not by their skin color.
Consider President Ronald Reagan's January 1986 radio ad-
dress in which he rejected charges that his administration had
attempted to do away with affirmative action and antipoverty pro-
grams and had weakened the enforcement of civil rights laws.Iu
Reagan stated:
We are committed to a society in which all men and
women have equal opportunities to succeed, and so we
oppose the use of quotas. We want a color-blind society. A
society, that in the words of Dr. King, judges people not by
the color of their skin, but by the content of their
character.1
26
John Jacob, then-head of the National Urban League, responded that
Reagan's interpretation of King's statement was a distortion of what
King actually meant. Jacobs stated, "For the administration to asso-
ciate the name of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. with the attempt to
destroy affirmative action is obscene.' 27
In February 1986, Reagan again turned to King to support the
explanation of his administration's efforts to do away with affirma-
tive action programs. Reagan stated that "we want affirmative action
to continue. We want what I think Martin Luther King asked for: We
want a colorblind society. The ideal will be when we have achieved
the moment when no one-or when nothing is done to or for anyone
because of race, differences, or religion, or ethnic origin; and it's
124. Culp, supra note 45, at 164.
125. See NORMAN C. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
(1988) (arguing that the Reagan administration's civil rights enforcement record was
weaker than the record of the six preceding administrations).
126. Reagan Quotes King Speech in Opposing Minority Quotas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
1986, at 20.
127. David E. Anderson, Urban League Blasts Reagan's King Speech, UPI, Jan. 23,
1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
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done not because of those things, but in spite of them.', 128 Reagan's
use of King to support colorblindness is all the more disturbing
given Reagan's comment that it was too early to tell whether King
was under Communist influence. 29
William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General during
the Reagan Administration, expressed the view that the "struggle
continues for a national heritage blind to skin color or ethnic back-
ground." ' 3° Reynolds argued that Brown v. Board of Education13 1 set
forth the judicial insistence on colorblindness in public school sys-
tems, and contended that the "true essence [of the colorblind
principle] was best captured, in my judgment, by Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., when he dreamed aloud in the summer of 1963 of a nation
in which his children would 'not be judged by the color of their skin,
but by the content of their character.' ,13
In 1991, during the United States Senate's hearings on the
nomination of Clarence Thomas to the United States Supreme Court,
Senator Alan Simpson asked what was wrong with a colorblind so-
ciety and referred to King, the "greatest . . . civil rights leader...
[who] asked only that he and his children be judged, quote, 'based
on the content of their character and not on the color of their skin,'
unquote. Isn't what he was asking for was [sic] a colorblind judg-
ment, and isn't that exactly what Judge Thomas is advocating?',
33
In 1992, President George Bush declared that he shared King's
dream of a colorblind society. One commentator, offended by Bush's
comments, noted that Bush had used the Willie Horton fear tactic
128. The President's News Conference, PUB. PAPERS 200, 201 (Feb. 11, 1986).
Shelby Steele argues that Reagan "may have aspired to racial color blindness, but
few would grant that he ever reached this sublimely guiltless state." SHELBY STEELE,
THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA 8 (1990). In
Steele's view, Reagan's professed colorblindness "clearly revised reality, moved it
forward into some heretofore unknown America where all racial determinism would
have vanished," and "was really a claim of racial innocence and guiltlessness-the
preconditions for entitlement and power." Id.
129. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, INTEGRITY 57 (1996)
130. William Bradford Reynolds, The Reagan Administration's Civil Rights Policy:
The Challenge for the Future, 42 VAND. L. REV. 993, 994 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
131. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
132. William Bradford Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of
Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995, 1000-01 (1984) (citation omitted) (quoting address by Martin
Luther King, Jr., Aug. 28, 1963).
133. Senate Judiciary Cmte/Fhomas, Fed. News Serv., Sept. 20, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, ARCNWS File. As for whether Thomas was advocating col-
orblindness, recall his color-aware charge that he was the victim of a "high-tech"
lynching for uppity blacks who in any way deign to think for themselves ... " JOHN
C. DANFORTH, RESURRECTION: THE CONFIRMATION OF CLARENCE THOMAS 145 (1994)
(quoting Thomas' testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee).
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and racism in his 1988 presidential campaign and had opposed af-
firmative action proposals.34
In a 1992 book, Jared Taylor'35 expressed his hope that
"[s]omeday the entire edifice of race-based preferences will be torn
down' '136 and referred to King's "I Have a Dream" speech as support
for his position. Characterizing the development of what he called
an explicit racial identity of Blacks as the "guiding light of a move-
ment to carve out racial privileges based on race," Taylor asserted
that race-consciousness on the part of African Americans "was a re-
jection of the color-blind vision of Martin Luther King, and a
violation of the tacit agreement under which whites were abandon-
ing their own racial identity. 137 Again, as detailed in Part II, King
was not opposed to race-conscious action that would have ad-
dressed the effects of past discrimination against African Americans,
and he supported preferential treatment and the compensation of
Blacks in recognition of the unpaid slave labor that was critical to
this nation's economic development.
1 38
A more recent effort to misuse King to support the colorblind-
ness thesis is found in Dinesh D'Souza's The End of Racism.'39
Deceptively reducing King's complexity and legacy to a "vision of a
society in which we are judged as individuals on our merits,"
D'Souza argues that the "mention of King's insistence that character,
rather than color, should be the basis of public decisions inspires
134. See William A. Shroyer, Bush Doesn't Hold Same Beliefs as Dr. King, Hous.
CHRON., Jan. 28, 1992, at A13.
135. Dinesh D'Souza has described Taylor as a bigot and notes that Taylor edits a
newsletter called AMERICAN RENAISSANCE which has contained items stating that:
the acceptance of racial differences may be good for Blacks; Blacks celebrated in their
usual destructive, riotous style after the Chicago Bulls won the National Basketball
Association championship; and no mantras numb the brain like the phrase "All men
are created equal." D'SOuzA, supra note 26, at 387-88. D'Souza also reported that he
saw Taylor talking with David Duke at a 1994 "white preservation" meeting in At-
lanta, and that Taylor has stated that the Black separatists were right and also
warned of the possibility of a race war. See id. at 389. According to D'Souza, the mes-
sages of AMERICAN RENAISSANCE are that
Western civilization is inherently white, America was founded on white
norms, immigrants are perennial outsiders, blacks are "Africans in America,"
they are in America but not of America, race determines culture, miscegena-
tion and intermarriage are an abomination, and racial separatism, preferably
separate black and white nations, is the answer.
Id. at 396-97. Taylor, responding to D'Souza, contends that D'Souza distorts what is
written and said in American Renaissance. See WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1995 (letter to the
editor), at X13-14.
136. JARED TAYLOR, PAVED WITH INTENTIONS: THE FAILURE OF RACE RELATIONS IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 214 (1992).
137. Id. at238.
138. See TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 1, at 367.
139. D'SOUZA, supra note 26.
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embarrassment and anger... ."'40 According to D'Souza: "It is no ex-
aggeration to say that a rejection of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s vision
of a regime in which we are judged solely based on the content of
our character is a virtual job qualification for leadership in the civil
rights movement today." D'Souza also asserts that "King never
abandoned his principled position of color blindness. 42 D'Souza's
fundamental misunderstanding of King and his failure to see King's
color-awareness is repeated throughout The End of Racism. For in-
stance, he erroneously argues that King was an adherent of
colorblindness. 143 For the reasons discussed throughout this essay,
D'Souza's contention that King was colorblind is both factually and
thematically wrong and cannot be squared with King's color-
awareness.
The Republican leadership of the U.S. House of Representatives
has quoted King in support of their call to eliminate affirmative ac-
tion. Attorney Al Latham, a volunteer for the anti-affirmative
action California Civil Rights Initiative, quotes King's "content of
their character" statement.' 45 House Speaker Newt Gingrich and
Linda Chavez, both conservatives, have quoted King in stating their
opposition to affirmative action programs. 46 Other "neo-Kingists"
include California Governor Pete Wilson and California Civil Rights
Initiative Chairman Ward Connerly.1
47
B. The Dangers of Misappropriation
The daunting task of demonstrating or calling for colorblind-
ness in a country in which race matters48 requires one to grapple
140. Id. at 163, 164.
141. Id. at 165.
142. Id. at 199.
143. See id. at 201 (referring to "King's principle of a race-neutral society in which
laws and policies are indifferent to color"); id. at 266 (referring to King's "doctrine
that race should be ignored and we should be judged on our merits as persons"); id.
at 317 (noting that King and other Black activists "appealed to merit-based hiring,
conducted without regard to race, as an effective means to ensure that able and de-
serving candidates got the job"); id. at 542 (claiming that King favored colorblind
principles in the public and private sectors).
144. See William Douglas, Future Tense, NEWSDAY, June 18, 1995, at 6.
145. See Gregory Lewis, Affirming the Dream: Would King Find Recent Decisions in
Line with Civil Rights?, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 31, 1995, at C-1.
146. See Tom Bates, Opponents of Set-Asides Use King's Words, THE PLAIN DEALER,
Jan. 14, 1996, at 4A.
147. See id.; Prepared Testimony of Ward Connerly, Chairman, California Civil Rights
Initiative Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Fed. News Serv., Apr. 30, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
148. See CORNEL WEST, RACE MATrERS (1993).
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with difficult questions regarding the application of concepts of
equality in a society that "has rejected equality of income and wealth
as both unnecessary and counterproductive. ""9 As a result of in-
completely theorized agreements with respect to the meaning or
meanings of equality, some individuals will agree on a general no-
tion of equality without agreeing on the colorblind thesis, while
others will agree on the colorblind thesis without agreeing on a
large-scale theory of equality.'s° Additionally, debating the color-
blind thesis raises the issue of what constitutes "discrimination." Is
"discrimination" to be understood in its ordinary, dictionary usage
such that all discrimination (whether against or in favor of an indi-
vidual or group) is unlawful, or is the term "discrimination" to be
used and understood in a technical legal fashion such that, for ex-
ample, prohibited discrimination against members of one group is
distinguished from permissible "discrimination" (affirmative action)
in favor of members of another group?"' Ordinary usage would
support colorblindness, while technical legal usage would not pre-
clude and could support an argument for color-awareness.
Furthermore, settling on an equality principle or concept of dis-
crimination at any given point does not mean that those
understandings have permanence or a fixed political valence. 2
Rather, and because of the phenomenon of "ideological drift" iden-
tified by J.M. Balkin, their "valence varies over time as they are
applied and understood repeatedly in new contexts or situations."'5 3
Ideological drift is illustrated by the movement of colorblindness
away from the concept offered in 1896 by Justice Harlan in Plessy v.
Ferguson';4 and toward the current use of colorblindness as the
"rallying cry of conservatives who seek to protect white males from
racial oppression.',
5
The misappropriation of King's legacy is all the more alluring
for those who would otherwise have to address the aforementioned
issues and debate the thesis on the merits. That King would be mis-
149. Sunstein, supra note 123, at 194; see also id. ("American political thought has
never been egalitarian.").
150. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1733 (1995). Sunstein notes that individuals "favor racial equality, but they are di-
vided on affirmative action," and "may believe that government cannot discriminate
on the basis of race, without settling on a large-scale theory of equality . Id. at
1739.
151. This analysis is discussed in George Rutherglen, Discrimination and its Dis-
contents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117, 127 (1995).
152. See J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L.
REV. 869 (1993).
153. Id. at 870 (footnote omitted).
154. 163 U.S. 537.
155. Balkin, supra note 152, at 871.
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used by colorblind proponents for purposes of the debate is not sur-
prising, for he
was-and remains-the leader that whites would have
chosen for black Americans if they had the power to
choose. To white eyes, King was safe and acceptable. It is
hardly accidental that they invariably referred to him as
"Dr. King," as if to draw assurance from the credentials he
had earned in the white world. King stood for civil rights
and peaceful change, as opposed to the fists of black
power. . . . He also represented a mainstream religion,
Baptist, which gave his movement moral impetus as well
as political stature. Colleges and universities literally lined
up to give him honorary degrees.'
5 6
It was this view of King that became "the establishment's model of
what blacks should strive for: interracial harmony, coalition build-
ing, mutuality of interests across color and class lines.',
57
The passage of time since King's life and death makes it easier
to misuse and abuse his legacy. The farther away extant society is
from the days of the Civil Rights Movement and the less informed
society is and remains about the specifics of those days, the more
likely it is that some will simply not know or appreciate King's real
views. Because "what is forgotten is as crucial as what is remem-
bered,"'' 9 some have found it convenient to, in Henry Louis Gates'
words, "airbrush out the more radical aspects" of King.'60 Such air-
brushing has been applied by advocates of colorblindness who enlist
King in support of their cause. Invoking the name of Martin Luther
King, Jr., in support of colorblindness gives proponents of that the-
ory a number of advantages. First, it provides them with a powerful
rhetorical weapon. Linking the image of Dr. King and his efforts in
the struggle against racism and injustice to colorblindness provides
that theory with a veil of legitimacy. If not closely examined and
156. HACKER, supra note 122, at 63. Michael Eric Dyson has noted White attempts
to make King a "safe American hero" and the "attempts of some blacks to portray
him as the tool of an amorphous white power structure. Neither view is true."
DYSON, supra note 98, at 98. Henry Louis Gates has argued that King's academic
credentials were stressed "to underscore his powers of reason, his gravitas, [and] his
middle-class respectability .... Gates, supra note 3, at 7.
157. Id.
158. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 601, 601
(1995)("[Hjuman beings see history through their own filters, including their own
assumptions, and the result is, inevitably, something other than unmediated access
to what happened before.").
159. Gates, supra note 3, at 7.
160. Id.
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analyzed, this veil could serve to replace reality and set up a no
question zone-after all, the misappropriators can argue, how can
one disagree with Dr. King? How can those who are color-aware
square their position with the purported colorblind vision of the
man who said that he dreamed of the day when his children would
not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their
character?
Despite manipulations of rhetoric, the argument that King was
colorblind is simply wrong. But in the absence of a willingness to
educate ourselves and to correct the glaring as well as the subtle er-
rors in the King-supported colorblindness argument, it becomes
easier to misstate and distort King's views and to substitute iconola-
try and fundamentally flawed assumptions for argument and
accurate conclusions. If the King-was-colorblind argument is not
refuted, the misuse of his legacy will continue to be used to illegiti-
mately skew the colorblind versus color-aware debate in favor of the
former. That debate should be won or lost on the strength of the ar-
guments made and reasoning employed by both sides and not on
the basis of caricature, misrepresentation, and misappropriation.
CONCLUSION
Those who disagree with the proposition that the "question of
race" is "not one of blindness, but of vision"'' 1 should search for and
rely upon facts and themes that do not misappropriate Martin Lu-
ther King Jr.'s legacy. Any such misuse of King as a symbol for
colorblindness must be recognized for what it is: a deception
(knowing or unknowing) built on misleading sound-bites, ahistori-
cal and acontextual "analysis" and other fundamentally flawed
premises. This deception must be highlighted and continually ques-
tioned by those who are interested in accuracy, principled argument,
and respect for King's actual words, acts, and life.
161. Wilson, supra note 34, at 1263.
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